Scholars have credited the victory of Edward Brooke, America's first popularly elected black United States senator, to a 'deracialised' or 'colour-blind' election strategy in which both the candidate and the electorate ignored racial matters. This article revises this prevailing historical explanation of Brooke's election. Drawing from the historicalideational paradigm of Desmond King and Rogers Smith, this paper argues that Brooke was much more of a 'race-conscious' candidate than is generally remembered. Primary documents from the 1966 campaign reveal that Brooke spoke openly against racial inequality, arguing in favour of racially targeted policies and calling for stronger racial equality legislation. In addition, this paper argues that Brooke's appeals were not targeted primarily to the state's small black population but to liberal whites. Far from ignoring race, internal campaign documents and interviews with campaign staff reveal that Brooke's campaign strategists sought to appeal to white desires to 'do the right thing' by electing an African American. Internal polling documents from the Brooke campaign and newspaper commentaries further demonstrate that a proportion of the white electorate cited Brooke's race as the reason for supporting his candidacy. This paper suggests that Brooke's election was extremely well timed -coming soon after the passage of the Civil Rights Act and Voting Rights Act but before the urban riots of the 'long hot summer of 1967', the King assassination riots, and anti-busing riots in Boston. The first half of Brooke's 1966 campaign slogan 'Proudly for Brooke: A Creative Republican' signals the race-conscious dynamics of his candidacy. 
Introduction
The election of Edward W Brooke to the United States Senate in 1966 was the first time that an African American had been popularly elected to the country's most powerful legislative chamber. 2 Unsurprisingly, discussion of the election has focused on its racial dimensions, and scholars have long credited Brooke's victory in Massachusetts to a 'deracialised' election strategy in which both the candidate and the electorate ignored racial matters.
3 This article revises this prevailing historical explanation of Brooke's election, arguing that scholars have crucially misinterpreted the way race featured in the campaign. Drawing from a wealth of primary sources, this paper argues that Brooke was much more of a 'race-conscious' candidate than is generally remembered.
Applying Desmond King and Rogers Smith's paradigm of racial policy alliances to the electoral arena, this paper proposes that Brooke more accurately should be described as a 'race-conscious'
candidate. 4 First, Brooke's strong sense of his own racial identity and his understanding of race in
American history align much more closely with the 'race-conscious' coalition than that of the 'colourblind' alliance. Second, Brooke's policy agenda was not 'colour-blind' or 'deracialised' but contained a set of race-conscious policies designed to tackle racism beyond de jure racial discrimination. Third, Brooke's appeal to white voters subtly but unmistakably acknowledged the aspirations of wanting to 'make history' and 'do the right thing' by electing a qualified African American candidate. Relatedly, as interviews with key campaign staff indicate, Brooke's racial symbolism was an important factor in drawing liberal whites to work and volunteer for his campaign. The article will proceed as follows. The first section sets out the theoretical framework. The second section analyses Brooke's racial identity and his political development. The third section turns to appeal was thought to be effective, given the widespread advice given to black candidates in the fifty years since Brooke's election that deracialised appeals are necessary for political success in majoritywhite jurisdictions.
This article makes extensive use of primary materials drawn from several archives: Senator Brooke's official papers held in the Library of Congress and his personal papers at Boston University, as well as the papers of his Democratic opponent Governor Endicott Peabody, which are held at the John F Kennedy Presidential Library. From these repositories, I focused attention on the content of internal campaign memoranda, correspondences, internal polling reports, and newspaper clippings. The article also draws from two interviews which I conducted with Senator Brooke in the final year of his life --one by phone in February 2014 and one at his home in May 2014. I also interviewed key members of the Brooke campaign staff as well as Brooke's opponent for the Republican nomination. Where anonymisation is necessary, interviewees are coded with 'EB' followed by a unique number, for example 'EB3'. In addition, several first-hand accounts of the 1966 election, including Brooke's own autobiography, Elinor Hartshorn's PhD thesis, and an analysis published by Brooke's pollsters, have proved to be invaluable sources of primary material.
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I -Race-Conscious vs Colour-Blind Politics
The first section of this paper offers a reassessment of the theoretical framing of Edward Brooke's racial campaign strategy, long thought to be an example of a 'deracialised' campaign strategy. I argue that scholars have wrongly understood the racial dimensions of Brooke's candidacy due to inadequate theorisation of the possible campaign strategies available to black candidates in majority-white jurisdictions. This paper argues that the conditions of Brooke's candidacy (timing within the development of the civil rights movement, racially non-confrontational competition, candidate biography, and the racial attitudes of his electorate) gave Brooke licence to speak to white voters with much more straightforward race-conscious language and content than commentators have generally believed is possible for a black candidate in a majority-white election.
Most scholarship on black electoral politics has been limited to two models of black candidacy: the 'racialised' campaign model, which is said to be typical of majority-black constituencies and the 'deracialised' campaign model in majority-white constituencies. The deracialised model's central hypothesis is that white voters will not support a black candidate who overtly identifies with his or her black racial identity. If black candidates can avoid associations with their black racial identity, then they can minimise the salience of race in the campaign and attract white support on a non-racial basis. According to this view, the only way in which black politicians win election in majority-white jurisdictions is by purging any racial content from their campaigns.
In the 1960s, the population of Massachusetts was 2.2% African American. 14 Therefore, according to the racialised/deracialised campaign paradigm, one would expect Brooke to deploy a 'deracialised' campaign strategy in order to appeal to the 97.8% of Massachusetts voters who were not African American. Indeed, Brooke's success has widely been credited to running a 'deracialised' campaign. 'Colour-blind' advocates are willing to remove legal barriers to discrimination but oppose racially targeted policies and tend to discount the enduring role of race in shaping life outcomes. 20 Indeed, colour-blind advocates consider any race-based public policy to be inherently discriminatory and racist, even if such policies are targeted at assisting historically marginalised racial minorities. In contrast, the race-conscious policy coalition holds that centuries of slavery and racial apartheid in American have had an enduring social and political legacy, even in an era of formal, legal equality.
They argue policies should be made with the explicit concern for reducing America's severe racial inequalities because the mere removal of de jure racial discrimination is insufficient to addressing the effects of centuries of racism in America. Advocates within the race-conscious coalition are critical of colour-blind philosophy which they believe 'disguises (sometimes deliberately) or normalizes (sometimes unwittingly) relationships of power and subordination'. within the black community, Brooke had managed to break into majority-white state politics in an unprecedented way. While Brooke had not limited himself to exclusively black politics, he remained proud of his black racial identity and cognisant of the need to represent the issues and aspirations of that community.
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Racial Identity
As his biography manifests, it is perhaps unsurprising that Brooke had a strong sense of racial identity. Racial identity refers to a person's sense of 'linked fate' with people of a similar racial or ethnic background. 'Linked fate' is measured by the degree to which, in this context, Brooke believed that his own interests in particular were tied to those of other African Americans in general. 46 Brooke himself expressed the view that blacks share a common bond when it comes to matters of racial equality. It is 'something they are born with, that they have to live with', he explained. 47 Brooke's life exhibits signs of sharing this solidaristic bond with the African American community; although, he never operated to the exclusion of cooperation with whites.
Brooke's personal racial identity was tied to a wider race-conscious analysis of American history.
Brooke told his biographer John Henry Cutler, 'The American Negro didn't come over on the Mayflower… but he was right behind it -in chains. And he rowed the boat to get here'. 48 Given that
Brooke's grandfather, with whom he had been close, had been born a slave and Brooke felt that his own father had been denied job promotions because of racial prejudice, he was able to place his own family's racial history within the wider story of American race relations. 49 Brooke was conscious of the enduring effect that generations of race-based slavery and segregation had yielded on the condition of black people in America. In a policy statement released in August 1966, Brooke argued, 'Racial discrimination has struck at the heart of the American dream for over two hundred years'.
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For Brooke, racism was an historic sin which continued to affect all black Americans.
It is important to underscore that Brooke was one of the last of a generation of black leaders who personally knew someone who had been born into slavery. 
Race-Conscious Policy Agenda
Among the key features of the 'deracialised' strategy are a focus on 'racially transcendent' issues and the offer of a 'race neutral' policy programme. 73 It has been argued by some commentators that Not only does the high salience of race in Brooke's campaign rhetoric suggest a race-conscious candidacy but also Brooke supported policies which clearly distinguish him from the 'colour-blind' coalition. While the colour-blind policy alliance accepts the need to remove racially discriminatory legal barriers, Brooke argued that ending racial discrimination in the law was insufficient. During the 1966 campaign Brooke, condemned the de facto segregation that existed in the North nearly as strongly as he condemned de jure segregation in the South. Brooke argued that segregation in the North has 'risen primarily from community custom and indifference'. In a policy paper distributed during the senatorial race, Brooke argued, 'Discrimination is a system that will yield only to a coordinated, comprehensive, strategic attack'. 90 Brooke maintained that targeted racial policies were required to reduce racial inequality in housing, employment, and education. Many of these policies, including his support for forced busing, the use of federal loans to accelerate housing integration, and the removal of public money from facilities which had failed to desegregate, placed Brooke in the minority of public opinion, even in Massachusetts. 91 His positions can hardly be viewed as 'playing safe' to appeal to white voters, given that they were at odds with the majority of the Massachusetts electorate. For example, Brooke's internal polls found that 60% of Massachusetts voters disagreed with his position on school desegregation.
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Scholars have almost uniformly downplayed Brooke's race-consciousness in order to present him as a 'colour-blind' or 'deracialised' candidate and, in doing so, have overlooked a more significant aspect of his political success: the ability of a race-conscious black candidate to win in a majority-white electoral context. 
Race-Conscious Appeals to African Americans
Race-Conscious Appeals to Whites
While African Americans were a loyal constituency, they were numerically insubstantial, making up just over 2% of the state population. A strategy which appealed only to African Americans was illsuited to win in such a statewide context. Instead, I argue that Brooke's race-conscious rhetoric and policy agenda was mainly targeted to the state's liberal white population.
Jason Sokol has argued that the Massachusetts 'electorate would prove itself to be color-blind' by electing Edward Brooke. 105 Yet, the notion that voters were 'blind' to Brooke's race is not supported by the evidence. In contrast with the view that white voters 'overlooked' race, survey data and interviews suggest that liberal whites were motivated to vote 'proudly' for an African American candidate. In an interview with this author, Brooke's field director Carmen Durso explains that the campaign believed that Brooke's support for civil rights policies would prove popular with many Massachusetts whites. 106 Internal strategy documents from the Peabody campaign reveal that the Democrats recognised that the Republicans had much to gain from the 'dazzling' Brooke, who as a 'Negro Republican Senator from Massachusetts would be a stunning asset for the Republicans'.
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The Republicans acknowledged this point among themselves. Even Barry Goldwater, whom Brooke However, Brooke's campaign manager Al Gammal, who was more politically conservative than Brooke, sent a memo to Brooke urging the candidate to abandon the slogan: 'I do not like the word "proudly," and certainly not in this context. It has a highly negative implication. You can be proud of someone for a number of reasons, none of which qualify him for the office he is seeking…If the salient implication, and it may be taken that way, is that we are proud of you because you are a Negro from Massachusetts, then I resent it and so will the people, and for that matter, so ought you".'
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According to his staff, at the time Brooke did not agree. While it is difficult to determine how many voters were attracted to vote for Brooke on the basis of race-conscious appeals, there is some -admittedly limited -polling data to suggest that race was the main motivation for some whites to vote for Brooke. Brooke's internal polling firm Opinion Research
Corporation conducted interviews with voters in October 1966 asking them to state succinctly why they were supporting Brooke. The transcribed interviews have been recorded and are held in the Brooke archive in the Library of Congress. This author has coded 93 responses into 10 categories:
anti-Peabody, character, leadership, name recognition, party loyalty, past performance or experience, policy, race, self-presentation, or no reason. The most common reason people cited was their approval of the job he had done as attorney general (one third of responses). Race was the fourth most common response, with 8.6% of the sample. The results of the analysis are displayed in Figure 1 followed by a selection of the responses filed in the 'race' category.
[ Figure 1 here] other reasons, an important one being race. The "permission" factor is critical in American politics and I believe it was in play here. Hence, while the chart is accurate, I think it understates the support for him because of race'.
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White Activists
In addition to attracting votes from whites, the racially symbolic significance of Brooke's race was a major factor in attracting talented staff from around the country to work for his campaign, the overwhelming majority of whom were white. Justice Department attorney Joe McMahon came to Massachusetts specifically to work for Brooke. He explained in an interview with this author that he moved to the Bay State because 'I wanted to work for the leading Republican African American'.
McMahon, who was hired by Brooke as a travelling assistant, adds, 'I was so dedicated to him, mainly because I had worked in the civil rights division of the Justice Department under Bobby Kennedy… So, my focus was entirely on the idea that we needed to develop diversity in the country, and diversity in the country meant we had to have African Americans at high levels of our political structure because otherwise we were going to continue not to have the role models and to have people not to feel that justice was also theirs'.
124
In addition to paid staff, the campaign received 'hundreds' of mainly young volunteers who wished to Johnson, September 5, 2013. 125 Stephen Herbits interview by Richard Johnson, January 10, 2014; Bernard Ryan, Hillary Rodham Clinton: First Lady and Senator, (New York, 2004), 12. 126 EB3 interview. wasn't like he was stepping in not having any experience. I think people might have questioned that'.
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IV -1966 as a 'Race-Conscious' Moment
For some observers, it might seem curious that a race-conscious African American was able to win election to the US Senate in 1966 but no other African American was able to do so again until 1992.
In the fifty years since Brooke's election, African American candidates are routinely advised to pursue a deracialised campaign strategy if they expect to win white votes. Why, then, did Brooke with a race-conscious strategy attract substantial support from white voters?
In this section, I analyse the public opinion attitudes of the residents of Massachusetts in 1966. I argue that the location of the election was crucial. While racial prejudice was present in Massachusetts, the state viewed itself as more enlightened than the rest of the country and electing Brooke was seen to be a 'feather in our cap' as one resident put it. Additionally, I contend that Brooke's election was extremely well timed, coming before the most serious urban riots and white backlash to integration in the North.
Massachusetts Exceptionalism
According to campaign staff, explicit racial prejudice was rare. Brooke himself contended that he did not recall much racism on the campaign trail in 1966. 'I shook mostly white hands, looked into mostly white faces, and with very few exceptions, saw no anger in their eyes '. 128 It is unlikely that racial prejudice was absent in the election, but this author holds that negative racial voting manifested itself less strongly than the aforementioned positive racial voting.
From a prima facie perspective, the lack of racial hostility might seem surprising given Americans' 
Conclusion
Edward Brooke's election to the United States Senate was a major historical feat, which was not again repeated by a black Republican until nearly fifty years later. 154 It is evident that the racial dimensions of his campaign merit serious attention, and this article has been in part an effort to complicate assumptions that Brooke was a colour-blind candidate who ran a deracialised campaign. While
Brooke did not emphasise racial issues in a manner that was hostile or exclusivist, he did not ignore race, publicly identifying racial injustice and proposing race-conscious policies to address them at both legal and societal levels. It is also evident that for some white voters, supporting a black candidate as a matter of pride was a powerful motivation. This article has also attempted to integrate the viewpoints of the candidate, the campaign team, and voters. It is clear that the dominant models of 'racialised' and 'deracialised' campaigns do not fully capture the variety of ways in which black candidates present their racial identity to majority-white electorates.
Instead, Edward Brooke should be seen as a race-conscious candidate whose rhetoric and policy agenda reflected Brooke's personal analysis of the enduring legacies of slavery and racial prejudice.
The racial dimensions of Brooke's candidacy deserve continued scholarly attention -not because Brooke successfully ran a 'deracialised' campaign but because Brooke, as an African American, was able to present a race-conscious policy agenda to a white electorate and win their support. 
